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Between Materialism and
the Metaphysics of Eternity
A Reply to Joseph M. Spencer’s Review
of Responsibility of Reason

Ralph C. Hancock

BYU Studies strives to involve readers in the LDS academic experience. In
that spirit, we offer this scholarly exchange between Ralph C. Hancock and
Joseph M. Spencer based on Spencer’s “Goodness and Truth: An Essay on
Ralph Hancock’s The Responsibility of Reason,” found in BYU Studies
Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2014): 61–73.

I

t is a blessing to have Joseph Spencer’s serious reading of my book
from a Latter-day Saint perspective. Responsibility of Reason is about
what the title says, but since it addresses fundamental questions about the
world and our place in it, and since a Mormon wrote it, I would certainly
hope that at some level it would shed light on concerns fundamental to
Mormonism and, indeed, suggest a Mormon contribution to the pivotal
questions of the Western tradition. I am glad Spencer finds it to be a step
in that direction.
Spencer and I seem to agree, largely, on the problem, which is a
certain approach to modern materialism. The problem lies not so much
in elevating the status of the material, natural, or physical, but rather in
a theoretical framing of the natural as an open field of human mastery.
The problem, as Spencer notices, is a privileging of the theoretical over
the practical. There is a paradox here (which I explore in my book at
some length) in that this extreme theoretical rationalism (which has
shown its political face most clearly first in the Jacobinism of the French
Revolution and then in Marxist-Leninism) is driven by aims in one
sense very “practical,” that is, to transform the world—“the mastery and
BYU Studies Quarterly 54, no. 2 (2015)173
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possession of nature for the relief of the human condition” was the formula dear to early moderns such as Francis Bacon and René Descartes.
This modern materialism is at the same time a secular-humanist idealism, but an idealism that has abandoned responsibility for its action
because it has lost touch with the practical and concrete sense of the
human good. Deeper than any metaphysical or theoretical doctrine lies
the endless and thus rudderless modern project of mastery, the spirit of
what Heidegger called “technology”—by which he meant not an assortment of powerful machines but the very ontology, the very orientation
toward being, that underlies the deployment of those machines. Human
power is everywhere, Heidegger observed, but humanity, or some distinctively human meaning, is nowhere to be found. Thus modernity, as
Leo Strauss once wrote, is a blindly advancing colossus: all power and
no purpose. Modern progressivism, I submit, is a milder, self-disguised
version of this blind colossus, although in the American version it is
fortunately tempered, as Tocqueville understood so well, by Christian
and other premodern admixtures.
Spencer and I seem to go this far together in our critique of extreme
modern rationalism, this idealistic materialism whose effectual truth is
Technology—but then one of us somehow loses the thread. Our parting company seems to be owing to two main thrusts of my argument
that I may not have made clear enough or that were lost in a long and
complicated text in which I contend with various philosophical adversaries and rivals from various angles. These overlooked main points
are: (1) my argument is not metaphysical but practical (in a way that is
inseparable from reflexive examination); and (2) I do not appeal to a
premodern Platonic totalizing cosmology (if indeed the ancients can be
accused of such) but rather to a Tocquevillean balancing of ancient and
modern responses to the Truth and to the openness of the human spirit.
Nowhere do I affirm the availability of a “morally ordered cosmos”
that is “total and consistent,” as Spencer writes (68). My Platonism, as
he at first seems to notice, is more open-ended or aporetic: I take my
bearings from Plato’s wonder about the elusive order of a cosmos that
escapes us and not from any completed metaphysics that might cash
out in a full and determinate system of natural law. (If I had wanted
to defend the idea of natural law, I would have done so somewhere in
my 300-plus page book.) Spencer himself notices that for me “the good
is inevitably experienced indirectly, always in the form of derivative
[I would say practical] goods, emphatically in the plural” (65). Here is
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my attempt, from the book, to articulate a Platonic response to human
wonder before the elusive order of the whole, the common yet mysterious fittedness of mind to thing:
This awareness of the goodness of thinking cannot fail to issue into the
thinking of goodness. The primitive discovery of the immediate evidence of some order and goodness connecting mind and being does not
of course give anything like a complete understanding of the order of
this whole. The whole and the good that yokes it, that makes it a whole,
remain elusive—a mysterious something that, as Plato says, every soul
pursues whatever it is pursuing, but without being able to grasp what
it is. But every soul already participates, already is part of some larger
whole and is subordinate to some “higher” authority—political, moral,
religious, or rather, originally, all these at once, indistinguishably. The
“soul” or “the human spirit” comes to self-awareness as a part of a larger
whole, a particular whole with a particular history.1

It should be clear, then, that while I appeal to a certain intimation of
order, I am very far from invoking a totalizing system of metaphysics
and natural law. Rather, I call upon reason to acknowledge its limitations and to accept responsibility for the imperfect traces of order
implicit in the practical experience of an actual community, with its own
history, institutions, and practices. In doing so, I recognize the validity
of not only “vertical” (aristocratic) but also “horizontal” (Christian-
democratic-progressive) figures of transcendence and thus dissent
pointedly from Leo Strauss’s fundamentally aristocratic strategy of classical “natural right”:
Strauss’s deliberately aristocratic proposal of the lofty autonomy of
philosophy as a stable ground of practical elevation is already proving
implausible and unstable, even or especially in the hands of Strauss’s
most ardent or high-minded disciples. . . . [Strauss’s] project of recovering the elevation of philosophy as the highest good compels him to
deny the legitimacy of human longings for a liberation or salvation that
addresses the whole of our humanity, our fulfillment in love as well as
in knowledge.2

Thus the more conservative part of my argument, which indeed
points up the importance of reason’s deferring to practical intimations
1. Ralph C. Hancock, The Responsibility of Reason: Theory and Practice in a
Liberal-Democratic Age (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), 61.
2. Hancock, Responsibility of Reason, 26.
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of an order that constrains human power, is only the first half of my
project (though admittedly the most prominent and emphatic through
much of the text). The other half—and here is where the example of
Alexis de Tocqueville is crucially important—emphasizes the modern
aspect of the Truth, that is, human freedom, or a human openness to
possibility never fully realized or represented in any community or even
any cosmos. Like Tocqueville, I want to hold together aristocratic “elevation” or excellence with democratic “justice” (and thus openness to a
future of possibility).
The irreversible Western inheritance of an eternity not indifferent to
time implies a more elusive, if arguably also richer and dynamic, sense
of the meaning of human existence than can be contained in the classical ruling idea of reason. It therefore also implies a more hazardous
horizon for practical reason, in effect a resignation to the impossibility
of containing the soul’s longings within a specific, substantive understanding of the nobility of the good. The illusion of the simple superiority of “theory” to “practice” (or vice versa) cannot be sustained. . . .
Practical reason today must be attuned to the truth of the fundamental aporia that is the deep spring of Western dynamism, the aporia
defined by alternatives of, on the one hand, a horizon of knowable
goodness above ordinary human concerns [ancient moral order, if you
will] and, on the other, by the Christian and revolutionary promise of
the regeneration of all humanity [modern freedom].3

Thus, if there is something distinctly Mormon in my practical or moral
metaphysics, I hope it is just this: I try to attend both to the truth of eternal moral law and to the truth of open-ended human freedom.
And this takes us to the theme of LDS “materialism,” which is central
to Spencer’s essay. I do not think it is very helpful to assimilate a poetic
and in some ways inchoate LDS cosmology to modern materialism,
precisely because modern materialism is just a face of the technological project I sketched above. Mormon materialism seems to me to be
poised precisely between an ancient metaphysics of eternal order and
a modern metaphysics of the will to power. (Terryl Givens’s “Romantic” reading of early LDS thought often captures this equipoise, I think,
although, like Romanticism itself, it risks going off the rails of eternal
progress and veering into technological power. See my interviews with

3. Hancock, Responsibility of Reason, 27.
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Givens online at Meridian Magazine Expand.4) Spencer himself grants
the Mormon cosmos “an inherent moral ordering,” which is enough to
distinguish it radically from anything truly modern.
This moral ordering inherent in Mormon materialism seems to put
it in a different category from Alain Badiou’s metaphysics of “inherent
multiplicity.” I have only a secondary familiarity with Badiou’s metaphysics, I admit, but his well-known “Pauline” communism explicitly
excludes a consistent or unified moral order and seems to be fully implicated in the anti-metaphysics of modern mastery, the idealistic materialism I thought Spencer disliked. In his Saint Paul: The Foundation
of Universalism, Badiou follows the modern recipe to the letter: the
Truth is stripped of all authoritative good, and so revolutionary human
action (allegedly Pauline “universalization”) can proceed without any
particular moral or religious restraints. Badiou’s atheistic appropriation
of Pauline universalism is the purest formalism, a splendid example of
modern theory’s utter subjugation of actual human practice, the apotheosis of technology in the name of a humanity with no human content.
Such sweeping secular appropriation of Christian idealism is quite an
old story (going back, as a matter of fact, to Bacon and Descartes—and
even to Machiavelli), and I think Badiou’s “metaphysics of multiplicity”
is finally driven by, or at least aligned with, this totalizing secular political project.
But let me conclude on what seems to be a large measure of agreement between Joseph Spencer and me: Mormon poetic theology seems
to point to some dynamic eternal materialism consistent with inherent
moral order. By way of suggestion, my account of reason, which is at
once reflexively critical and aware of its responsibility to the best of
inherited and culturally embedded authority, might point to a meeting
ground between two of the most impressive enterprises in contemporary Mormon theology: Terryl Givens’s Romantic moral dynamism and
James Faulconer’s anti-metaphysical openness to the Other. The Responsibility of Reason might also serve as a caution to both modern and
postmodern theologies not to succumb to progressive enthusiasm or to
anti-metaphysical ire.

4. Ralph C. Hancock, “Terryl Givens’ Foundations: Wrestling with History
and Theology,” Meridian Magazine Expand, November 11, 2014, http://ldsmag.
com/terryl-givens-foundations-wrestling-with-history-and-theology/.
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A Reply to “Between Materialism and the Metaphysics of Eternity”
Joseph M. Spencer
In his response to my review of The Responsibility of Reason, Ralph
 ancock suggests that I have missed two essential points of his arguH
ment. First, he believes I have missed the essentially practical—rather
than metaphysical—basis of his argument. Second, he believes I have
wrongly attributed to him the view that the moral order of the world is
total and consistent. I appreciate his further explanations and clarifications, but he has not as yet convinced me on either of these points. It
seems, though, that I need to clarify my critique of his position. I would
like to address these two points briefly and then add a word or two in
defense of my interest in Alain Badiou.
Regarding the first point, I recognize that Hancock’s argument is
practical rather than metaphysical. The difficulty is found in the practical bearings of Hancock’s argument that seem to presuppose, however
subtly, a metaphysics. Hancock makes clear in what sense he takes reason
to bear an irremediable responsibility to real goods. But it must be asked
how one goes about knowing the goods in question—that is, knowing
goods as goods. An epistemological question of fundamental importance
goes unasked and, therefore, unanswered in Hancock’s work. Or rather,
to the extent that there is an answer to this question in The Responsibility
of Reason, it is to be found implicitly packed into the notion of the Good,
the fittedness between human intelligences and the contours of the real.
There, in the (implicit) dependence of the knowability of practical goods
on the knowledge-granting existence of the Good, I find a set of metaphysical commitments.
The second point mentioned above concerns the nature of those
metaphysical commitments. I fail to see how to distinguish between
commitment to the existence of the Good and commitment to a moral
order that is both total and consistent. To make this point clear, let me
insist that by “total” I do not in any way mean—as, I think, Hancock
assumes—“totalizing,” where this last word would bear within itself certain political echoes. When I speak of a total moral order, I mean just
that it is all-encompassing, that its extension or its scope is total, that it
forms—in Hancock’s own consistent words—a whole. If that much is
clear, perhaps it can be seen why any insistence on the knowability of
goods as goods, inasmuch as this knowability (however limited it may
be) is predicated on the existence of the Good, appears to be wedded to
an insistence on a moral order both total and consistent. The mysterious
fittedness between human intelligence and the existence of real goods
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol54/iss2/12
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depends on a certain wholeness and consistency in the moral ordering
of the real.
If this is right, then I remain convinced that Hancock paints a picture
that, even as it nicely fixes the boundaries of the questions that need asking, does not quite match up with what I find operative in Mormonism—
as I have already argued in my review of The Responsibility of Reason.
Regarding my use of Badiou’s thought in attempting to outline—
far too briefly!—a repositioning of truth rather than goodness at the
heart of Mormonism, I find Hancock’s dismissal somewhat confusing.
He recommends pursuing something positioned “between an ancient
metaphysics of eternal order and a modern metaphysics of the will to
power,” but this seems to me a beautiful encapsulation of Badiou’s very
thought, and it serves as the motivation for my interest in the work of
Badiou (and similar thinkers). At any rate, everything in Badiou that
supposedly does follow what Hancock calls “the modern recipe” can be
found in Joseph Smith himself, who ignored the institutional authority
of established religion, questioned the canonical boundaries of scripture,
troubled prevailing conceptions of sexuality, refused to countenance the
contours of contemporary politics, and calculated to lay a foundation
that would revolutionize the world. I find it significant that he did all
this in the name of truth.
A Modernizing Rhetoric in a Modern Context: A Final Reply
Ralph C. Hancock
I thank Joseph Spencer for his thoughtful and pertinent reply, as I do
for his original review. I take heart from the narrowing of any substantial disagreement between us to two fundamental questions. The first,
which concerns the relation between theory and practice, or between
knowing and doing, is as elusive as a question can be; there will never
be one right way to say (theory) what cannot be said (practice). So
philosophy necessarily shades into poetry or into theology when such
basic intuitions or orientations are at stake. In this sense, I think Spencer
is asking for too much when he asks for an answer to the “epistemological” question: as befits an author whose sympathies seem to be more
“modern” than mine, he asks that I decide in advance just what can be
known (concerning the Good, notably), before claiming to take practical responsibility for any goods. He thinks I make but do not justify a
Platonic claim regarding the cognitive apprehension of the total Good,
a justification he thinks would be needed to ground my practical (moral
and political) position.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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But I am trying to evoke a position in which any attempt to ground
practice in theory (or vice versa) is seen to be misguided and potentially
dangerous; my whole purpose is to point to a moment prior to the distinction between theory and practice. The very apprehension of the Good
translates into an attunement between our human existence and some
larger reality. But this attunement can never be reducible to a purely theoretical, “metaphysical” apprehension; it cannot exist apart from an interpretation inevitably affected by our moral-political condition as human
beings—and this condition is always in some way particular, never simply
universal, though it is open to what is highest. So my whole argument—
perhaps itself elusive, even chimerical—is that there is no metaphysics
that lies deeper than this attunement to a larger order, which is always a
moral-political attunement. In other words, the ultimate rightness of the
practical whole, the realm in which we undertake meaningful actions,
can never be fully distinguished from our ultimate philosophical or religious orientation. Though I derived this notion of the mutual implication
of humanity and divinity from rigorous readings of the likes of Heidegger
and Leo Strauss, it might well be considered a deeply Mormon feature of
my project to articulate the meaning of reason’s responsibility.
Where the rubber of this argument hits the road, at least as concerns the discussion between Spencer and me, concerns the relation
of Mormonism to some ancient/modern polarity. Despite my explicit
Tocquevillian stance of equilibrium between these poles, Spencer thinks
I lean too much toward the ancients (the moral authority of a Platonic
total Good). Well, I certainly lean that way when I push back against what
I regard as ill-advised enthusiasm for a one-sided “modern” (progres
sive, anti-traditionalist) view of our Mormonism. (And I certainly do
not think Spencer is the most appropriate example of this modernizing
Mormonism.) I do think that the different conditions of the world, and
of the Church in relation to the world today, call for a different rhetoric
than might have been dominant in the first generations of the Church.
For instance, Spencer claims that Joseph Smith “troubled prevailing conceptions of sexuality,” but in the present modern context, such
troubling looks very different. It also looks very different from anything
Spencer would espouse. Such misdirections can easily arise among
audiences who find modernist rhetoric attractive but overlook context.
The language of Joseph’s revelation on marriage abounds in legalistic
restrictions that place sexuality squarely within the bonds of marriage
between a man and a woman (though a plurality of marriages might
exist), which is a conception that harks back to an ancient order more
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than looking forward to modernity. To be clear even at the risk of being
simple, I think the ongoing contemporary liquidation of traditional
norms and bonds requires that we Latter-day Saints recognize the continuity of our most fundamental goods with those “traditional” goods
(such as marital fidelity) now being dissolved. “Metaphysically,” I appreciate what I see as a marvelous Mormon equipoise between (ancient)
eternal norms and (modern) free possibility. But there is no question for
me concerning which of these poles is now more under attack, and thus
more in need of emphasis, both in theory and in practice.

Ralph C. Hancock is Professor of Politcal Science at Brigham Young University, receiving his MA and PhD in political science from Harvard University.
Besides writing The Responsibility of Reason (Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), he
is the editor of America, the West, and Liberal Education (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), which includes his own writings as well as essays by influential
scholars such as Allan Bloom and Stanley Rosen. He has also written articles
for First Things, Square Two, Political Science Reviewer, and FARMS Review.
Joseph M. Spencer recently earned his PhD in philosophy from the University
of New Mexico, and he is currently teaching as an instructor in Brigham Young
University’s Department of Ancient Scripture. His recent works include For
Zion: A Mormon Theology of Hope (Greg Kofford, 2014). He is the associate
director of the Mormon Theology Seminar and an associate editor of The Journal of Book of Mormon Studies.
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